

TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

SENT TO: U.S. Mission GENEVA TOSEC 36

NIACT

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE
ACTING SECRETARY
RE SECTO 25-762.00/7-2362

The following comments have been prepared by senior officers
of the Department, including Bohlen:

In view of shortage of time and necessity of it reaching you
before your next meeting with Gromyko, it has not REPEAT NOT had
White House clearance, therefore represents only Departmental view.

Gromyko's comments in your two meetings do not add any factual
material or any new arguments which would be of assistance in
making a new evaluation of Soviet intentions. General tenor of the
conversation seems to us to stick squarely on previous positions
but is presented in a somewhat more definitive way in regard to the
signature of a separate peace treaty. It is likewise noticed that
Gromyko read from a paper which would indicate that he was
operating under instructions from highest authority, but it is also
noted that he

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tended to back away at end of first conversation on the threat aspect of his remarks. It is also significant that he put not time limit or date in regard to the signature of a peace treaty and was even more evasive when pressed as to exactly what would be its consequences other than implication of his remark that arrangements would have to be made with GDR and not with Soviet Union.

when satisfied that there is no give to use this as a justification for an eventual separate peace treaty.

Another conceivable but less likely motivation is that a strong negative Western attitude might be utilized by the Soviets as an argument against those elements within the communist bloc (in particular East

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Indicates no indication of any significant opposition to the threat aspect of his position. It is also indicated that he goes home with a date in mind to the conclusion of his tour and has over-all plan objective which increased us to exactly what would be the consequences other than implication of his remark that arrangements would have to be made with GDR and not with Soviet Union.

Despite generally tougher line, it is no more possible now than it was earlier to make any accurate prediction as to course of Soviet future action and we are still inclined to believe that Soviets have not definitely made up their mind on this aspect.

The threat of Soviet action and the constant repetition about the necessity of removal of Western troops would seem to be in line with recent indications from Moscow of Soviet position. It is possible that this line is dictated by a desire to probe in depth the Western position and when satisfied that there is no resistance use this as a justification for an

German) or over-riding the Soviet Government who have been pressing for

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a radical solution of Berlin question. A strong Western attitude would demonstrate that any radical solution carries with it a great risk of war. We are unable to carry the analysis any farther.

It is of course conceivable that Gromyko may show some more flexibility in your next meeting with him, which we understand is at

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a radical evolution of Beijing suggestion. A strong Western attitude would demonstrate that any radical proposal carries with it a great risk. We are unable to carry the analysis any further.

It is of course conceivable that Gromyko may show some more flexibility in your next meeting with him, which we understand is at noon, Geneva time, tomorrow. We have noted that Gromyko has referred to the removal of Western forces as the "crucial point" of discussion. You might care at the next session if he sticks to this point to say that you had already given all the arguments as to why this was quite inconceivable for Western acceptance and in general shorten the conversation if there seems to be no Soviet give and tell Gromyko you would report his attitude to the President on your return and suggest that he should do the same with Khrushchev.

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